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Rockwell argues in this broad-ranging text that mind ought not to be identified 
with the brain. More generally, Rockwell argues for the rejection of “Cartesian ma-
terialism,” his term for any attempt to identify mind with any particular part of the 
“brain-body-world nexus.” It is the partitioning of that nexus that is problematic. 
Rockwell argues first that, given the inseparability of brain and body processes, 
mind is not confined to “neurons in the skull” but is pervasively present throughout 
the body; he then argues that mind cannot be bounded by the skin, either, given 
the organically necessary interactivity of “inner” processes with “outer.” Mind is 
thus only to be identified with the entire brain-body-world nexus.
One problem with the thesis is that the key concept, mind, remains unex-
plicated. Given this, it is impossible to give an unqualified yea or nay to Rockwell’s 
thesis. It is plausible, indeed, necessarily true, that when “mind” is understood in 
precisely the way required by his thesis, it is exactly as Rockwell describes it to be. 
A different conceptualization of mind—say, as a certain set of capabilities of an 
organism—would lead to a different conclusion, and we are given no compelling 
and independent reasons for taking the concept of mind in Rockwell’s chosen ho-
listic sense.
Rockwell rejects pan-psychism; it is only that portion of nature in close in-
teraction with the organism, its “world,” that participates in constituting its mind. 
However, since any narrowly described portion of nature is itself in intimate in-
teraction with larger portions, it would seem by parity of reasoning that we can-
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not unarbitrarily confine an organism’s mind at all. If this admittedly unpalatable 
consequence is to be avoided, limits to “mind” there must be. The fundamental 
question is conceptual—Which delimitations should we decide to place on the use 
of the term “mind”?—rather than, as would appear from Rockwell’s treatment, 
empirical—What does contemporary science tell us about the nature and location 
of mind? But Rockwell construes the problem as empirical, in his calls for experi-
ments “that are expressly designed to falsify the claim that the mind is the brain,” 
without which “we cannot say that this claim has been scientifically established” (18) 
and his claim that “a non-cranial mind is a genuine empirical possibility”(19).
Yet even fundamental conceptual decisions should be informed by the stron-
gest of contemporary science. Pragmatists will agree and will find Rockwell’s adop-
tion of a version of Deweyan pragmatism and commitment to Dewey’s “empirical 
method” of doing philosophy a strength of the work. Rockwell’s exposition of the 
relevant neuroscience is welcome, but ultimately disappointing. There is a discon-
certing naivete in Rockwell’s admonitions that the brain should not be privileged 
as the sole embodiment of mind, that it has “no right” to be so construed given 
that neuronal activity occurs elsewhere in the body; the brain is not strictly iso-
lated from the rest of the body; it is not “autonomous”; it does not possess “intrinsic 
powers” making it causally independent; it is not a “closed system”; and it is thus 
not “entirely responsible” for an organism’s mental states. These observations are 
true—no one biologically informed would suggest otherwise. But Rockwell is do-
ing ardent battle with a straw man, for, though he attributes the view to “modern 
physicalists,” it’s unlikely that anyone actually holds the “Cartesian materialist” 
view of an independent substance-like brain that he argues against. 
Accepting that the brain is not autonomous, it is still puzzling that Rockwell 
pays so little heed to the stunning level of sheer complexity of the neuronal activity 
occurring “in the skull.” Rockwell is derisively dismissive about the brain, while cu-
riously mystical about the mind. Consciousness, Rockwell holds, is a dynamic and 
abstract pattern that emerges from brain-body-world interactions, a pattern that 
can be “embodied by different stuffs at different times” and that perhaps “ripples 
through the world even though there is a biological creature at its center.” It is not, 
he says, “a piece of meat in the skull” (103). Students of functional neuroanatomy 
and -physiology may reasonably find fault with such insouciance about the intricate 
processes in the brain that are necessarily involved in the generation of the conscious 
experience of any organism. Yet Rockwell asserts that advanced neuroscience could 
even “end up eliminating the whole concept of brain” (10).
Rockwell argues that the pattern that is mind/consciousness should be un-
derstood as “. . . what Dewey called a system of tensions and what is now called a 
dynamic system . . . ,” (13) or, in other words, a “behavioral field.” Rockwell con-
siders contemporary dynamic systems theory the most promising route to model-
ing mind, for a “dynamic system” can be broadly described to include all the ele-
ments that in any way influence the system’s change over time. Such a description 
of a cognitive dynamic system fits well with Rockwell’s externalist conception of 
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mind. Rockwell conjectures that it should be possible to describe mathematically 
the basins of attraction that constitute the behavioral field of an organism, and 
thus possible “to quantifiably study how such a field radiates out from the organ-
ism into its environment” (206).
Rockwell draws on Dewey’s conception of the continuity, or “connectedness,” 
of nature, and considers his account of mind to be in the Deweyan tradition. But 
Dewey’s claim is that “mind” is a particular way of interacting with its environment 
that an organism might have. “Mind appears in experience as ability to respond 
to present stimuli on the basis of anticipation of future possible consequences, 
and with a view to controlling the kind of consequences that are to take place.”1 It 
is the organism that has the ability, and thus the characteristic “mindful” way of 
interacting; the nervous system is its mechanism for integrating its activity in the 
required way.2 Psychological states are “functions of a live creature as it lives in its 
natural surroundings.”3 The organism with a mind interacts, of course, in and with 
the environment, but Dewey does not seem to conceive mind in Rockwell’s holis-
tic, externalist fashion. Recognizing the primary continuity of literally everything, 
Dewey still finds value in the analytic distinctions of “self” and “world.”
In developing his thesis Rockwell ranges widely over contemporary philoso-
phy of mind. Yet problems in interpretation often arise. For example, in discuss-
ing John Searle’s “Background,” Rockwell describes the background as a special 
kind of commonsense experience, a shared, lived social context, a “background of 
meaning” (138). Searle’s Background, though, is a set of nonintentional capacities, 
including neurophysiological capacities, required for any intentional phenomena, 
including experience. Though Rockwell finds common ground, his account is nei-
ther the same as, nor consistent with, Searle’s, for Searle’s account is internalist, 
while Rockwell’s is radically externalist. 
Rockwell’s arguments are marred too often by reliance on empirical asser-
tions backed by limited acquaintance with requisite scientific knowledge. To give 
but one example, Rockwell concludes that the basic physical properties of the uni-
verse would probably not exist absent purposive conscious beings. His argument 
is: 1) energy is “defined as the ability to do work”; and 2) “I have never seen a defi-
nition of work that makes no reference to purposeful activity, and cannot imagine 
what one would look like.” Plus, 3) entropy is “usually defined” in a way that also 
includes reference to work. And thus 4) “it is probably just not true that energy 
and entropy would still exist if there were no purposeful beings in the universe.” 
Rockwell then goes on to employ his conclusion: in light of this, he asserts, “we are 
justified in dismissing Searle’s distinction between the observer-relative and the in-
trinsic. . . .” (145), there being nothing, even in physics, that is not observer-relative. 
The argument is internally flawed, moreover; it is not clear how it relates, at all, to 
the Searle contention Rockwell is disputing, namely, that syntax is not intrinsic to 
physics, but is always observer-relative. 
Rockwell’s main thesis—that experience, consciousness, and mind emerge 
from the interaction of organism and environment—and not from a brain con-
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ceived to exist in isolation—is a sound one, and a pragmatic one as well. The ex-
cursion he takes the reader on in its support is remarkably wide-ranging and thor-
oughly thought-provoking, and, though troubled at times, is well deserving of the 
reader’s careful study.
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